Continuing Protests in Iraq to Free al-Zaidi

CNN is reporting on the second day of countrywide protests in Iraq for the release of Muntadhar al-Zaidi. Significantly, protests are being reported in Sunni areas like Diyala and Anbar, now supposedly the bedrocks of American support. Could the warnings of a "shoe intifada" be correct?

Iraq's Militias

Two good articles on Iraq this week:

Ron Jacobs on the recent Green Zone proposal to exclude any party from Iraqi elections which has an armed wing. (Hmmmm, I wonder who that could be aimed at?). Jacobs' best quote: "The suggestion that Iraq should pay for its reconstruction assumes that the Iraqis asked to be destroyed by the US military."

Pepe Escobar on the militias, with a good focus on the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Peshmerga have been out of the news for some time now, but their role in stirring the cauldron of ethnic hatred in Iraq has been crucial. There've also been reports of the Peshmerga being used for operations in Southern Iraq, a sure way to increase Shi'a-Kurdish animosity.

La Resistance...Lives On

Joining the parade of evidence against George W. Bush's post-surge triumphalism are two more pieces today: a report from the Guardian on the regrouping resistance, and a report from Human Rights Watch about Iraqi refugees in Lebanon.

The Guardian report is the most exciting. In light of the vacillation of some of the most active elements of the resistance (Sadr, the Ba'athists), the revival of the 1920s Revolution Brigade is especially welcome. As the report indicates, the Brigade has also taken a quite principled stand against sectarian violence, refusing at this point to attack the al-Sahwa movement, even though they are clearly collaborators.

The HRW report, entitled “Rot Here or Die There: Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon,” paints a grim picture of situation of Iraqi refugees. It further makes a mockery of all the claims of "improvement" in Iraq. Though the latest NIE has diverted attention from Iraq and to Iran for the moment, you can be they are not going to be able to sit on this forever.

Iraqi Resistance: Know Your History

Recently there have been some blitherings in the comment boards about supporting the insurgency in Iraq. I just thought I'd make the terms of the debate clear to folks by presenting the Department of Defense's own data on the issue. This graph is from the DoD's very own "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," a quarterly report last issued in September. As you can see, in every single month of the insurgency, the majority of the attacks have been directed against coalition troops, aka the occupiers. There is a myth that Iraq is simply a nest of sectarian violence, but the truth is in fact far simpler. People don't like to be occupied, and are willing to use violence to secure their freedom.

This particular report is interesting because, as the DoD wonks note, "[a]ttacks against Coalition forces reached record levels in June, and the proportion of total attacks against Coalition forces increased to their highest levels since December 2005, accounting for 73% of all attacks." Thus the truth is actually the opposite of the dominant image of Iraqis growing ever more sectarian and spiraling downwards into a pit of blood feuds and terrorism. The surge has actually served to unite Iraqis even tighter against their imperial overlords. I've dealt elsewhere with the implications this has had for the different segments of the resistance, but suffice to say for now that one doesn't have to look far for the data with which to debunk the war machine's myths about Iraqis. In this instance, you only have to go to the Pentagon's webpage.

Revisiting the Resistance

There has been a welcome efflorescence of talking about the Iraqi resistance in lefty-liberal circles over the past few weeks. We have Michael Schwartz's article summarizing developments in the resistance, we have Pepe Escobar providing the reporting which Schwartz bases himself off of, and we have Robert Dreyfuss talking about the actions of the occupiers over the last few months galvanizing a new Iraqi nationalism. This is a breath of fresh air, especially when you compare it with things like Katha Pollit's drivel.

Dreyfuss, Escobar, and Schwartz all emphasize the significance of a Sunni-Shi'a parliamentary bloc (with the blessing of Ayatollah al-Sistani) challenging al-Maliki on an anti-occupation basis. The coming together of such groups is certainly to welcomed, and the fact that they've explicitly taken a stand against takfiri violence is especially important. It's also important that the coalition includes a large number of Sunni tribal leaders. The US has consistently tried to spread the idea that such leaders are the new base of US support in the occupation, something I argued against nearly a month ago. In other words, it's clear Schwartz and co. are right that there are some major new developments in the Iraqi resistance.

At the same time, I think there is reason to be sober about the long term stability of these developments. Nearly all of the forces involved have a strong history of vacillation between collaboration and resistance. al-Sader, for example, while often taking a militant stance, has recently been involved in talks with the US military. Sadr's lieutenants argue that the purpose of the ceasefire is to identify takfiris in Jaish al-Mahdi and drive them out. This could be the case, as Sadr's aide explicitly declares that "Anyone who collaborates with the Americans will be considered a traitor." However, as Dreyfuss points out, this could simply be Sadr positioning himself closer to the US and essentially convince them that he can keep order if they leave. Hardly the die-hard anti-occupation persona he sometimes adopts.

The so-called "New Ba'ath" front appears to be maneuvering in a similar fashion. Its leader, Izzat al-Douri, while recognized as a leader of the resistance, has also indicated that he would be willing to negotiate a ceasefire if the US agrees to a timetable. Again, like al-Sadr, the idea seems to be negotiating with the US to be in a better position to rule Iraq once the occupiers leave. There's also, of course, the long history of Ba'athist collaboration with the US.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC, formerly SCIRI) has an even worse history of collaboration. Juan Cole's description of SIIC's class background is essential for understanding its actions:

“SCIRI represents the great merchants, landowners and clerics of the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, who have dollar signs in their eyes at the prospect of the billions of dollars that the Iranian pilgrimage trade will bring in. The Sadrists represent the little people, who wonder where their next meal is coming from and who suffer from lack of fuel, electricity and services. SCIRI represents the Shiites who can afford their own generators.”

SCIRI was one of the first groups to ally itself with the United States after the invasion. As upper-class Shi'a, they had the most to gain from Saddam's overthrow (namely, a partnership with US capital.) In return, the US gave SCIRI control over the Ministry of the Interior. In this capacity, SCIRI's armed wing, the Badr Brigade, functioned as an extension of the US military. When the resistance was primarily Sunni, it was to the Badr Brigades that the CIA turned to break up emerging nationalist consciousness and enflame sectarian tensions. SCIRI, now SIIC, has gradually moved in a more anti-occupation direction since then, but this sordid past won't be easily escaped. Indeed, Escobar points out that the presence of the Badr Brigades at the united resistance talks casts an ominous shadow on promising developments. Escobar also mentions that the head of SIIC, Ammar al-Hakim, is in fact a supporter of "soft-partition," which puts him alongside that raging anti-occupation activist Joe Biden.

None of this should be taken to mean that there aren't exciting things happening in the politics of the Iraqi resistance right now. The fact that these different groups are starting to work together is extremely exciting. To me, it represents the leaderships of the different groups, whose position of power had previously often been based on sectarian grounds, finally coming around to the views of ordinary Iraqis, who have consistently opposed attacks on Iraqi civilians by elements of the resistance. This (belated) convergence of views is to be welcomed.

I also think, however, it's important to keep in mind the vacillation of the middle class leaders of the resistance. The stability of these leaders in resisting US buyoffs is going to be dependent upon the militancy of the resistance's rank and file (in addition to the ever-present stupidity of the occupiers).

*Update* As I said, the stupidity of the occupiers seems boundless. In the midst of a cease-fire with Sadr, they go and shoot up Sadr City, the base of his support. The excuse was going after the "Special Units," supposedly elite forces trained by Iran. This little incident will probably put more pressure on Sadr to take a harder stance.

Michael Schwartz on the Latest Developments in the Resistance

Michael Schwartz is one of the sharpest Iraq analysts out there. This is his latest piece on the resistance.

Is the US about to be driven out of Iraq

According to Pepe Escobar (below), one of the most informed and astute observers of Iraq events, there have been some momentous developments inside Iraq in the last few weeks, developments that could actually result in making the American occupation militarily and politically untenable.

Basically he says recent meetings among and between Shia and Sunni groups have initiated a set of alliances that could result in a united resistance that will suppress sectarian fighting (by suppressing the Sunni terrorist and the Shia death squads) and move in a coordinated way (using armed attacks and political maneuvering) toward expelling the U.S..

Here are the key elements:

First, there is a new nationalist bloc forming from those who have withdrawn from or always opposed the American backed government. It includes leaders of the Sunni resistance (including the groups that are supposed to have made an alliance with the US), Sunni parliamentary leaders (including the vice president of Iraq), Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army (the most powerful Shia faction which has always opposed the U.S. presence) and the Fadhila (the most powerful Shia group in Basra, which recently withdrew from the government). According to Escobar, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the most powerful Shia cleric, has blessed the new group.

Second, the key goals in the newly developed pact are: united efforts to expel the U.S. from Iraq, including dismantling the bases—with explicit endorsement of armed resistance if the U.S. does not agree to leave; an arms length relationship with Iran; no division of the country into autonomous regions; and no tolerance of jihadist groups that attack Iraqi civilians or death squads, or any armed forces attacking Iraqi civilians.

Third, the various Sunni resistance groups are now negotiating alliances among themselves (with a tentative agreement currently in place among all but one of the most important groups). Included in this new unity is a commitment to demobilize the jihadists who set car bombs in Shia areas (forcefully if necessary) and direct all armed struggle toward expelling the Americans, unless the U.S . agrees to leave.

Fourth, the SIIC, the strongest faction within the Maliki government (though Maliki himself is from another group, the Da'wa), appears to be responding to the pressure created by this new movement. Until now, despite being elected on a platform calling for U.S. withdrawal, SIIC had always said that U.S. troops were absolutely crucial to government survival and had said nothing against the permanent U.S . bases. Then, last week, the temporary leader of SIIC, Ammar al Hakim, called for U.S. withdrawal and for dismantling the bases, a position that is so alarming to the U.S. occupation that there has been a virtual news blackout about this dramatic switch of position. Whether this is an actual change of policy by the SIIC, or simply a rhetorical response to these latest political developments, remains to be seen.

Finally, it appears that recent statements by U.S. occupation authorities calling for "soft partition" of Iraq into three mostly autonomous regions may be a response to this new unity between Shia and Sunni. Realizing that the U.S. probably cannot sustain its presence if this new alliance is consolidated and strengthened, they are looking for a "divide and conquer" strategy that would allow the U.S. to control the three regions separately.

Escobar's article pieces together a bunch of separate developments into a coherent analysis, but it remains speculative. But his analysis does make sense of a lot of otherwise confusing developments. We need to see if the trends he identifies are consolidated, or if they are reversed by the strong centripetal forces within Iraq.

I think this is a very good starting place for making sense of the news in the next few weeks.

Poisoned Gift or Second-Hand Present?

Blackwater USA finally went too far. Though they've been committing low-level atrocities outside the jurisdiction of any body with oversight capabilities for some time now, the incident last Sunday that resulted in the deaths of approximately twenty Iraqi civilians appears to have been the final straw. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior's review, released today, concluded that Blackwater was wholey responsible for the violence, and demanded that they be replaced with Iraqi security companies (a delicious prospect, I must add. Given that the Iraqis overwhelmingly hate the the US occupation, I think that the possibility of key US diplomatic figures being placed under Iraqi care is one that anti-imperialists cannot help but relish).

The US response to this rather rude assertion of Iraqi sovereignty has been, of course, to flatly ignore it. The Yankee occupiers seem to have decided that a week of soul-searching is enough to ensure that Blackwater will cease and desist from such wanton violence in the future. This situation, I think, creates something of a problem for those seeking to blame the occupation's failure on the Iraqi government. While they insist that the al-Maliki government has the power and responsibility to stop sectarian violence, they brazenly inhibit the exercise of Iraqi sovereignty in the most basic areas. Do Iraqis have the power to determine whether insane ex-marines with automatic weapons will operate in their country with no oversight, or do they not? The US has answered decisively in the negative, and in doing so, they have ripped to shreds whatever thin veil of supposed sovereignty with which the occupiers sought to cover their war crimes.

This blatant level of imperial control is interesting, I think, in terms of larger trends in international law in the last century. China Mieville, the Marxist historian and theorist of international law, has described national sovereignty for oppressed nations as "a poisoned gift" (he takes the term from Hardt and Negri.) While on the one hand the removal of the colonial presence is undoubtedly a boon for the colonized, it also exposes starkly the dimension of internal class exploitation which an occupation often hides. At the same time, it casts the liberated country willy-nilly into the Hobbesian world of inter-imperialist rivalries.

Iraq, it seems, received this gift second-hand. The Us has already opened it, and taken all the fun toys, leaving Iraqis with little more than wrapping.

Assessing Anbar

Gary Langer on Anbar-

Withdrawal timetable aside, every Anbar respondent in our survey opposed the presence of American forces in Iraq - 69 percent “strongly” so. Every Anbar respondent called attacks on coalition forces “acceptable,” far more than anywhere else in the country. All called the United States-led invasion wrong, including 68 percent who called it “absolutely wrong.”

Vive la Résistance

Two excellent articles arguing that the resistance is right. Scott Ritter on Common Dreams, and David Swan at the Black Agenda Report. Ritter, a former Marine, is worth quoting:

"We are occupying their homeland. We are violating their sovereignty. We are butchering, abusing and torturing their citizens. Our continued presence is an affront to the socio-economic-political fabric that is (or was) Iraqi society. If someone occupied my hometown in the same manner Americans occupy Iraq, I’d be killing them any way I could. And I would be called a hero by my own people."